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Abstract 
We analyse the effects of the pension reform of 2011 on individuals’ retirement age, 
adequacy and distribution of the benefits for various categories of Italian workers. The 
main findings are an increase in the average retirement age, generally raising over time, 
coupled with a sizeable increase in average replacement rates. However, the most 
affected group is represented by women employees born in 1955 and retiring in the 
period 2012-2021, who face an average increase in retirement age of four years, while 
benefiting from an increase in the average replacement rate of thirteen percentage 
points. 
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In the autumn of 2011, the financial crisis, which in Europe had turned into a 
“sovereign debt” crises for those countries with high public debt, reached a peak. At that 
time in Italy, in order to quickly recover financial stability, a major reform of the public 
pension system was  introduced (law 214/2011). 
The key elements of the reform are: i) the immediate abolition of the early 
retirement option, which allowed to retire up to five years before reaching the old age 
requirement,; ii) the application of the Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) benefit 
computation mechanism to all workers for seniority accrued since 2012; iii) the strict 
link between the increase in life expectancy and age and seniority requirements; and iv) 
the (further) homogenization of requisites between genders – the old-retirement age 
requirement for women will be harmonized to that for men by 2018 - and between 
working schemes.  
The sensible increase in the minimum age of retirement and the short transition 
phase helped reaching financial stability by reducing pension expenditure by about 20 
GDP percentage points in the period 2012-2050 (RGS, 2014). Indeed, the reform 
contributed to recover the trust of international financial operators in the solvability of 
Italy. 
In this work we use a microsimulation model to analyse the adequacy and the 
distributive properties of the pension system after the reform of 2011 as compared to the 
pre-reform setting. Microsimulation is increasingly recognised as a key ingredient of a 
careful, evidence-based evaluation of the design of the tax-benefit and social security 
policy reforms (Figari et al., 2014). Its main strength lies in being a tool able to generate 
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synthetic micro-unit based data which may be used to answer “what-if” questions that 
otherwise could not be addressed (Li and O’Donoghue, 2013). 
The microsimulation model we build, CeRPSIM3, is the third release of the 
microsimulation model elaborated to study the Italian pension system in its evolution 
from a Defined Benefit to an NDC system (Borella and Coda Moscarola 2006, 2010). 
CeRPSIM3 is a partial equilibrium dynamic microsimulation model by cohorts, 
according to the taxonomy proposed by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006). Other 
microsimulation models designed to capture the different aspects of the Italian labour 
market and pension system include: Vagliasindi et al. (2004), Mazzaferro and Morciano 
(2008) and Caretta (2013), who analyze the long term redistributive effects of social 
policies; Dekkers and Belloni (2009) who focus on adequacy issues; Ando and 
Nicoletti-Altimari (2004) who analyze the effects of pension reforms on aggregate 
income, savings and asset accumulation; Leonbruni and Richiardi (2006), who build an 
agent-based model to study labour supply in Italy.  
Our strategy to study the effect of the 2011 reform is to build a relatively simple 
simulation model, featuring a detailed modelization of the pension rules characterizing 
the main social security schemes of Italian workers before and after the reform, and a 
realistic estimation of the labour income profiles. We simulate representative earnings 
histories decomposing the earnings process into a deterministic, group specific age 
profile, and an unobserved component modelled as an ARMA process plus an 
individual effect. The needed parameters are estimated on a panel sample of 
administrative data. We then simulate retirement patterns and pension benefits for 
various cohorts of workers, including individuals born in 1955, who retire between 
2012 and 2020, and younger cohorts who will retire in the future.  
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We find that the reform of 2011 increased the average retirement age by 2 to 3 
years for all the cohorts considered, with younger cohorts in general facing a higher 
increase. The greatest increase in the average retirement age occurs among women 
currently retiring (i.e. those born in 1955 in our simulations), for whom not only the 
early retirement option has been supressed but also the old-age requirement has been 
gradually increased in order to match the requirement for men by 2018.  
On the adequacy side, we find that average replacement rates from the first pillar 
increase for all cohorts and groups considered. The largest increase in the replacement 
rate following each year of retirement postponement occurs among the youngest, purely 
NDC, cohorts, a consequence of the actuarial adjustment of the benefits in the NDC 
system. 
The reform of 2011 also affects intergenerational redistribution as measured by 
the ratio of the present value of benefits and the present value of the contributions paid 
(benefit-to-tax ratio, or Present Value Ratio, PVR). This ratio, before the reform, was 
ranging between 1.5 and 3 for the generation born in 1955; as a result of the reform 
these values are reduced, although remaining well above one. As expected, younger 
cohorts display an average PVR very close to one, due to the implementation of the 
NDC system. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the 
evolution of the pension legislation in Italy. Section 3 describes the microsimulation 




2. THE PENSION LEGISLATION IN ITALY 
In the last two decades the Italian pension system has undergone a number of 
major reforms, all directed to recover long-term financial sustainability of the pay-as-
you-go first pillar and to boost the development of a funded second pillar.  
The second pillar pension system, based on private pension plans, was formally 
established in 1993 (Legislative Decree, n.124) and incentives to its development have 
been subsequently introduced at various times. The 2011 reform did not intervene on 
this field, so in this section we will focus on the first pillar. In particular, in section 2.1 
we describe the pension rules in place right before the 2011 reform, while in section 2.2 
we illustrate the reform.  
2.1 The first pillar before the 2011 reform 
Before 1992 the pension system was characterised by a Defined Benefit (DB) 
pension formula, based on the last few years of earnings, combined with soft eligibility 
rules, without any actuarial correction for age at retirement. The first reform, which took 
place in 1992, set new — and more stringent — eligibility requirements while 
preserving the DB system. After the transition phase, pensionable earnings were based 
on the entire worker’s earnings history and revalued at the nominal GDP growth rate. 
No actuarial correction for age at retirement was provided for, but the pension 
indexation mechanism was downgraded from wages to prices. Such an indexation 
mechanism has been since maintained by all subsequent reforms. 
A second major reform approved in 1995 rescheduled a new (and long) 
transition towards an NDC formula. The NDC formula harks back to actuarial fairness 
principles. Benefits are commensurate with the amount of payroll taxes paid capitalised 
at an interest rate equal to GDP’s rate of growth and annuitised according to life 
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expectancy at retirement. Access to retirement was initially quite flexible, as individuals 
were allowed to retire in the 57-65 age range, subject only to the constraint of having a 
pension higher than 1.2 times the minimum old age allowance. The reforms of 1992 and 
1995 have thus opened a long transition period which will end in 2030. Until then, in 
fact, the rules for accessing retirement and to calculate the pension benefit will evolve 
differently for different generations of workers. In particular, one can distinguish three 
groups: 
1 - workers who accumulated at least 18 years of service at the end of 1995: the 
pension for these workers is calculated with the DB rules as modified by the 1992 
reform. The age requirements for retirement have also been raised, as will be discussed 
shortly. Hence to these workers a Modified Defined Benefit (MDB) applies; 
2 - workers who started to contribute to the pension system before 1995 but 
accumulated less than 18 years of contributions at the end of 1995: for these workers the 
pension is calculated with a pro-rata (PR) system. The first part of the pension covers 
the seniority accrued up to the end of 1995 and is calculated with the DB formula. The 
second part of the pension instead refers to seniority accrued after 1995 and is 
calculated with the NDC formula. 
3 - Workers who entered the labour market since January 1, 1996: to these 
workers the NDC system fully applies. 
It is useful to describe the above mentioned pension formulae for the 
computation of the benefits, as the results of our analysis largely depend on them. In the 
MDB system, the benefit depends on pensionable income, that is an average income 
earned at the end of the career. As a consequence of the reform of 1992, the benefit 
consists of two parts, in which pensionable income is computed taking the average over 
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a longer period for seniority accrued after 1992. Apart from this complication, the MDB 
check is a traditional defined benefit pension computed as: 
 = 	 ∗ 	
 +	
 
Where W1 and W2 is pensionable income, that is an average income over the last 
five (W1) or ten (W2) years of the working career (ten to fifteen for the self-employed), 
revalued according to inflation (W1) or nominal GDP growth (W2), and c1 and c2 are the 
years of contribution accrued before and after 1992 respectively. The annual accrual 
rate α is equal to 2 per cent up to a certain threshold, gradually reduced for higher 
pensionable incomes. 
The NDC pension, for all categories of workers, is computed as: 















iNDC gCP δ    
where Ci is the contribution paid by the worker at age i, g is the five years 
moving average of the nominal GDP growth rate, δ is an age-specific annuity rate, a  is 
the age at which the worker entered the labour market and a  is the individual’s age in 
his final working year. In other words, the pension benefit in the NDC system is equal 
to the notional capital, that is the sum of all contributions paid, revalued to a rate equal 
to the five years moving average of the nominal GDP growth rate, multiplied by an age-
specific coefficient δ. The annuity rates δ are set by law as the inverse of the present 
value at retirement of a one unit annuity benefit, and are updated according to the life 
expectancy. In section 3.3 we describe them in more detail.  
The NDC pension formula fully applies to NDC workers, who entered the labour 
force after 1/1/1996. During the transition, that is for workers already active in the 
labour force in 1995, the pension benefit will be computed with a pro-rata mechanism, 
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that is as a weighted average of the MDB and NDC check, with the weights given by 
years of seniority accrued before and after 1/1/1996. 
Due to the length of the transition, numerous legislative measures have gradually 
raised the requirements for access to retirement, but without changing the method of 
calculating the pension. The legislative decree 30 August 2004 n. 243, the law  24 
December 2007, n. 247 and the law 30 July 2010, n. 122, gradually raised the eligibility 
requirements for retirement. In particular, the 2007 reform introduced the system of 
"quotas", according to which the right to retire is perfected not only with 35 years of 
contributions, but also with the achievement of a “quota” given by the sum of age and 
seniority contribution gained by the worker. This eligibility mechanism applies 
regardless of the pension scheme, MDB, PR, or NDC, and was expected to increase 
over time until 2013. The 2007 law also restated the transformation coefficients for 
calculating the NDC pension benefit (in force since 2010), and expected them to be 
updated every three years on the basis of demographic tables and long-term trend of 
GDP measured by the Italian National Statistics Institute (ISTAT). Finally, the Law of 
30 July 2010, n. 122, introduced a new "deferral" system of the time of retirement; with 
this mechanism the right to receive the pension benefits matures twelve (or eighteen, for 
the self-employed) months after meeting the requirements. Importantly, the same law 
also adopted an automatic update mechanism (every three years) of the age 
requirements for retirement, both for early retirement with the system of the "quota" and 
for old-age retirement, so that these ages are linked to changes in life expectancy (while 
seniority requirements are kept constant). In table 1 and 2 we summarize the eligibility 
requirements in place right before the reform of 2011. 
<Table 1 around here> 
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<Table 2 around here> 
2.2 The reform of 2011 
The reform of 2011, namely the Decree-Law December 6, 2011, n. 201 
converted into law December 22, 2011, n. 214, further tightened the requirements for 
accessing retirement, while maintaining the important principle of the adjustment of all 
the age requirements to the evolution of life expectancy, and extending this principle to 
seniority requirements as well. In particular, since 2012 individuals can access  
retirement benefits through two channels only: the old age pension or the seniority 
pension, where the latter rules the access to retirement benefit before the standard age, 
imposing obligations in terms of contribution paid.  
This reform also accelerates the introduction of the contributory formula to 
compute the pension benefits for all workers, starting from seniority accrued from 
January 1, 2012 (with a pro-rata system). While previous reforms were limited to 
reinforce the requirements (age and years of contribution) to enter retirement, in fact, 
this reform intervenes on the method of calculating the benefit, extending the 
application of the pro-rata method to all workers who, having completed at least 18 
years of contributions in 1995, would have accrued a pension entirely retributive (MDB 
workers, in our terminology). In this way, the reform pursues the principle of the 
uniformity of treatment of workers. Benefit checks for MDB workers, in fact, had been 
preserved by all previous reforms, creating a sharp discontinuity of treatment with 
workers who, having accumulated less than 18 years of contributions in 1995, have their 
benefits computed with the pro-rata mechanism (PR workers). The eldest individuals in 
the latter group will have roughly half the pension calculated by the MDB system, and 
half with the NDC system – and the share of the NDC component will increase over 
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time, as younger generations of workers reach retirement age. After the reform, also 
MDB workers will receive a pension calculated using the PR system, although for a 
much shorter period and with little influence on the amount of their pension. 
The law also changes the age and seniority requirements for accessing 
retirement, aiming to increase in the average retirement age. In particular, as 
summarised in table 3, the early retirement route based on the "quota" has been 
abolished, and the legal old age requirement increased by one year, but at the same time 
the "deferral" of the first benefit is abolished. In addition, the new reform speeds up the 
convergence of the old age of retirement of men and women in the private sector1. It is 
still possible to claim seniority pensions, with seniority requirement increased to 42 
years and 1 month of contribution for men and to 41 years and 1 month for women2. All 
age and seniority requirements are linked to increases in life expectancy.  
<Table 3 around here> 
The law also contains some mechanisms to smooth the transition to the new 
rules. For example, workers that accrued, by the end of 2012, the requirements valid in 
2011 for early retirement (60 years of age and 36 of contributions, or 61 years of age 
and 35 years of contributions, i.e. quota 96) will be granted access to retirement at the 
age of 64, that is two years earlier than the normal retirement pension. 
The reform of 2011 also confirms the possibility of early retirement for women, 
by opting for a benefit fully computed according to the NDC pension formula. This 
rule, already introduced by the reform of 2004 (art. 1, paragraph 9 of Law 243/2004), 
gives the possibility, until December 31, 2015, for female workers to get the early 
                                                 
1
 The old age of retirement for women will equate that for men in the year 2018, while before the 
reform convergence was due by the year 2026. 
2
 Starting with the year 2017, the pension check will be gradually reduced if the seniority 
pension is claimed before reaching the age of 62. 
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retirement pension with at least 35 years of contributions and a minimum age of 57, if 
female employees, and 58, if self-employed, provided they opt for the calculation of the 
pension according to the rules of the contribution system. 
The law also amends the rules for NDC workers, reintroducing some flexibility 
in retirement, however binding it to the passing of a minimum amount of the pension, as 
summarised in table 4. 
<Table 4 around here> 
In 2012, the age for accessing retirement with the NDC system is between 63 
and 70 years: the "normal" old-age requirement is 66 years. It is possible to access the 
"anticipated" retirement, between 63 and 65 years of age, only if in possession of at 
least 20 years of contributions and if entitled to a benefit equal to at least 2.8 times the 
social allowance granted to the elderly Italian citizens in need.3 
Starting from 66 years of age (what the law labels the "normal" age of 
retirement) the conditions for accessing retirement are less stringent, being required at 
least 20 years of actual contributions and an amount of pension equal to 1.5 times the 
social allowance. In the absence of these requirements, it is possible to claim a pension 
with only five years of contributions and without any constraint on the amount of the 
accrued pension at the age of 70 years. In addition, also for NDC workers it will be 
possible to claim seniority pensions with a minimum seniority of 42/41 years for 
men/women. All the age and seniority requirements set by the law are indexed to life 
expectancy. 
                                                 
3
 In 2012, the annual (gross) amount of the social allowance was € 5.577,00. 
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3. METHODOLOGY  
Our analysis makes use of CeRPSIM3, an updated version of CeRPSIM (Borella 
and Coda Moscarola, 2006, 2010). According to the taxonomy proposed by 
Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006), our model is a dynamic partial-equilibrium 
microsimulation model of the social security system.4  It is designed to analyse the 
distributional features embedded in the Italian pension system during its transition from 
a DB to an NDC system, fully accounting for the rules characterizing the main social 
security schemes and for the heterogeneity in the working careers of individuals. It 
simulates the main life-time events – i.e. all the events that can influence the retirement 
pattern and the pension benefits amount – of cohorts of individuals born since 1950, 
computes their retirement age and their retirement benefits and derives indicators to 
evaluate the adequacy and the inter- and intra- generational distribution of resources. 
CeRPSIM3 allows to isolate the effects of the change in legislation on retirement 
patterns and pension benefits of different cohorts of workers, as we can apply different 
pension rules (pre and post 2011 reform rules) to the same group of individuals (our 
simulated population), so that the outcomes vary only in response to the pension reform.  
The model is made up of two main modules. The population module builds up 
an artificial cohort of individuals at a time. Life of the simulated individuals evolves 
according to a set of probabilistic rules estimated from the main available surveys and 
administrative datasets and conditioned to the year of birth and the available socio-
economic characteristics. To each individual it randomly assigns the gender and a date 
of birth.  In succession it simulates her education pattern, marital status, and career 
                                                 
4
 For a survey on microsimulation models see also Creedy and Kalb (2006) and Li and 
O’Donoghue (2013).  
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profile, which includes the number of weeks worked in a given year and earnings, and 
contributions paid into social security. The number of weeks worked may vary from 
zero (if unemployment lasts a whole year) to 52 for full employment: the probability of 
working a certain amount of weeks in a particular year depends on the number of weeks 
worked in the previous year and on demographic characteristics, such as age, cohort, 
gender, geographical area. The earnings profiles of individuals, conditional on working, 
are accurately estimated as the sum of a group-specific deterministic component (that is 
a group-specific age profile) and an individual-specific stochastic component estimated 
from a panel of administrative data. Given the pivotal role of the estimated earnings 
profiles in the determination of the model outcomes, section 3.2 presents more 
extensively their derivation procedure. 
The pension module computes pensionable earnings and contributions paid, 
checks eligibility requirements, and calculates the pension benefits for a number of 
schemes (employees and self-employed) and different regimes (MDB, PR, NDC). If an 
individual is eligible, than the pension benefit is computed under the assumption that 
the individuals retires as soon as eligible. Indeed, in recent years (after the 2008 
reform), minimum retirement ages have been increased so much that this became the 
most likely scenario. Borella and Coda Moscarola (2010) show that for the cohort born 
in 1995 the desired retirement age estimated according to the behavioural rule of 
Belloni and Alessie (2009) is almost equal or even higher (as in the case of private 
employees) than the minimum retirement age, as set by the legislation in force in 2008.  
We analyse four cohorts of individuals born between 1955 and 1985, in order to 
show the effects of the reform for MDB workers, retiring between 2012 and 2020, for 
PR workers, retiring between 2018 and 2030, and for NDC workers, retiring after 2030. 
15 
 
Pension benefits are computed according to both the pre-  and to the post-2011 reform 
rules. For each cohort we simulate 15,000 heterogeneous individuals. 
We focus on self-employed and private employee workers pertaining to the main 
private employee scheme (FPLD). In the paragraph that follows we report a brief 
description of the main parameters and settings used in the simulations. A detailed 
description of the micro-simulation model is reported in the Appendix.  
3.1 Parameters and settings  
In the microsimulation model the unit of analysis is the individual. In building 
up the probability matrices used to model transitions across states, we refer to the 
available official statistics from the National Statistical Institute (ISTAT), to the Bank 
of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) and to administrative 
datasets provided by National Social Security Institute (INPS). We do not model the 
household composition, or household income and wealth, but we account for the marital 
status of our simulated individuals for the computation of the survival pensions. 
The assumptions about the evolution of the mortality play a key role in the 
simulations as they govern the survival of individuals over time, i.e. they determine 
whether simulated individuals reach the retirement age and when and if they will be 
entitled to a survivor pension; in addition, mortality determines the evolution over time 
of the annuity rates used to compute the NDC part of the pension benefits hence 
affecting the distributive impact of the pension rules5. In our analysis we use the official 
ISTAT mortality tables from 1974 to 2010 and the official ISTAT projections from 
2011 on. As for the macroeconomic variables, we set the interest rate, the inflation rate 
                                                 
5
 Also the evolution of retirement age strictly depends on the evolution of life-expectancy, but 
this is already embedded in the projections about the minimum age and seniority requirements provided 
by INPS.  
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and the GDP real growth rate at their historical levels up to the year 2013. For the future 
they are supposed to reach and maintain the levels of 2 per cent, 1.6 per cent and 1.5 per 
cent respectively. All the minimum and maximum thresholds for the determination of 
the payrolls and the benefits are updated with nominal GDP growth to avoid the “fiscal 
drag effects” (Sutherland et al., 2008). Indexation of pension benefits to inflation are 
done according to the current rules. 
3.2 Earnings  
Earnings age profiles have been estimated using a dataset drawn from the INPS 
archive6. The INPS archive officially records the complete earnings and contribution 
histories of all participants, that is, employees in the private sector and some categories 
of self-employed (for our purposes, craftsmen and tradesmen). The available sample is 
formed by all individuals born on the first and the ninth of each month of any year — so 
that the theoretical sample frequency is 24:365 — and reports employment spells from 
1975 until 2012. The archive contains very rich information about the earnings histories 
of the workers, recording spells of unemployment, sickness, as well as labour income 
earned each year.  
Based on these data, we estimate gross earnings profiles separately for men and 
women, self-employed and private sector workers, white and blue collar.7 We base our 
estimates on the sub-sample of individuals working full time and for the whole year. 
Later in our simulations, to allow unemployment spells, we rescale the simulated annual 
incomes for the relevant number of weeks worked in any given year. 
The estimated equation is: 
                                                 
6
 The file LoSai (Longitudinal Sample Inps) is available at the Italian Ministry of Labour website 
(http://www.cliclavoro.gov.it/Barometro-Del-Lavoro/Pagine/Microdati-per-la-ricerca.aspx). 
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γi ~ (0, 2γσ ) ; ηit ~ (0, 2ησ ) 
where xit is a vector of individual characteristics, including a constant, a polynomial in 
age (third degree for self-employed, fourth degree for employees), ten-year cohort 
dummies (cohorts 1935, 1945, 1955, 1965, 1975), regional dummies (north, centre, 
south), and time dummies, which are assumed to sum to zero and be orthogonal to a 
time trend (Deaton and Paxson, 1994, Deaton, 1997). The unobserved component is 
assumed to be the sum of a random effect (γi) which does not vary over time and is 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables included into the equation, plus an 
autoregressive AR(1) component with parameter ρ. The AR(1) process plus individual 
random effect has been found to be a good characterization of the unobserved 
component of earnings in Italy in previous work (Borella, 2004). The estimated 
coefficients are reported in tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix. 
The availability of a long panel of administrative data is clearly an advantage, as 
it permits the estimation of relatively flexible specifications of earnings profiles for 
various groups of the population and for different generations, without having to rely on 
restrictive assumptions needed when the data source is a cross section (Vagliasindi et 
al., 2004, Mazzaferro and Morciano, 2008) or a short administrative panel (Caretta et al. 
2013). 
The average profiles obtained are shown in figures 1 and 2. In figure 1 we draw 
the estimated earnings profiles for private sector employees born in the centre of Italy in 
1975 (that is, between 1970 and 1980). White collar men have the higher income 
profile, followed by white collar women, blue collar men and women. The average 
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annual growth rate in real wages in the private sector is 2.7 per cent per year for white 
collar males, while white collars females have flatter profiles with an average yearly 
growth of 1.9 per cent. For blue-collars, average annual growth is 1.9 per cent for males 
and 1.3 per cent for females. Figure 2 shows the estimated real income profiles for self-
employed workers born in 1975. Also in this case, the average rate of growth is higher 
for men, about 1.5 per cent, while women display flatter income profiles (with an 
average growth of about 1.2 per cent).  
<Figure 1 around here> 
<Figure 2 around here> 
In the simulations, each individual is given his average log earnings profile for 
his age and group (defined by cohort, gender, region and occupation) plus an error term 
formed by the sum of the two unobserved components. The first one is drawn from a 
normal distribution with variance 2γσ , and it permanently shifts up or down the average 
profile for the individual it refers to. The second component, which is also individual-
specific and varies over time, is formed by the shock from the previous period, times the 
autoregressive parameter ρ plus an error term drawn from a normal distribution with 
variance 2ησ . 
 
3.3 The annuity rates 
An important ingredient for a correct evaluation of the pension coverage of 
future generations of PR and NDC workers are the annuity rates, i.e. the coefficients 
used to annuitize the present value of contributions. The law n. 247 of 2007 rules the 
automatic adjustment, every three years, of the annuity rates to life expectancy. The law 
n. 122 of 2010 explicitly provided for the extension of the coefficients for ages greater 
19 
 
than 65 years, when the evolution of the age requirement for accessing to the old age 
pension would have increased over age 65. The law n. 214 of 2011 anticipated the 
update in 2013 and introduced an automatic adjustment to life expectancy every 2 years 
from 2018 onwards.  
The effect of the adjustment of the annuity rates to the demographic evolution is 
a reduction in the coefficient at any given retirement age, because of the increase in life 
expectancy. However, as we show in the rest of this section, the annuity rates are 
substantially constant at the age of the old age requirement, as the latter is also evolving 
with life-expectancy.  
Using the latest demographic forecasts published by ISTAT (2011) and the 
formulae published by the State General Accounting Office (RGS, 2014), we calculate 
the annuity coefficients in each year in our simulation. To summarise their evolution, in 
table 5 we report the predicted coefficients at some relevant ages for the PR and NDC 
generations considered in our simulation, that is those born in 1965, 1975 and 1985. The 
table highlights how, for example, the coefficient for retirement at age 65 is reduced 
over time. For clarity, the inverse of the annuity coefficient is also reported, 
representing approximately the average expected life captured by the coefficient, which 
is a weighted average computed over men and women8. To interpret the table, consider 
individuals born in 1965: their projected minimum age of retirement in the NDC system 
is 65 years and 2 months9. As shown in table 5, the annuity coefficient at age 65 for this 
generation implies an average expected life of about 21 years (that is, the NDC pension 
                                                 
8
 More precisely, it is the expected life of the pension benefit, whose duration depends on the 
gender of the pensioner and on the probability of leaving a heir who will receive the corresponding 
survivor benefit. 
9
 That is, according to the projections provided by INPS, in 2030 the minimum age of retirement 
in the NDC system will be 65 years and 2 months. 
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for individuals aged 65 will be computed by dividing the present value of the 
contributions by about 21). For the generation born in 1975, the expected evolution of 
mortality implies that the projected minimum age of retirement in the NDC system in 
the relevant year will be 66 years (and 9 months). In that year, 2041, also the annuity 
rate will be different as it is constantly updated to mortality: indeed, the coefficient at 
age 66 implies an expected life of about 21 years, reflecting the lower (predicted) 
mortality of that generation. For the following generation the same reasoning applies: 
the minimum age for retirement in the NDC system is higher by about one year (it is 
predicted to be 67 years and 11 months in 2052), and the annuity rate at age 67 again is 
updated and reflects an expected life of 21 years. The same indexation mechanism 
applies to all the relevant ages (normal and maximum age of retirement), as they are all 
linked to life expectancy. As life expectancy increases, the legal ages of retirement 
increase, the annuity rates at any given age are reduced, but the annuity rates at the legal 
ages of retirement remain more or less constant. 
<Table 5 around here> 
 
4. RESULTS 
In this section we show the effects of the 2011 reform on the age of retirement, 
the ability of the pension system to preserve pre-retirement income levels and the 
degree of actuarial fairness. In doing this, we are implicitly considering the pension 
system in terms of an insurance for the longevity risk (in line with the study by 
Feldstein and Liebman, 2002) with premia represented by the payroll taxes paid during 
the working life upon which the benefits (the pensions) should commensurate.  
4.1 The age of retirement 
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We begin by exploring the effect of the reform of 2011 on the retirement path of 
the various cohorts. In Figure 3 we draw the percentage of retirees per year and cohort; 
as in our model individuals retire as soon as they reach minimum requirements, the 
graph shows the path of minimum requirements through time for both scenarios, before 
and after the reform. For example in the upper panel, displaying the “before reform” 
scenario, the first cohort on the left, born in 1955, retires between 2012 and 2023. In 
2013, corresponding to age 58, there is a spike in the exit rate due to the option given to 
women to retire with the NDC benefit at age 57 plus a deferral time of 12 months (or 
18, if self-employed). This same cohort exhibits another spike in the years 2017-18, that 
is when reaching the minimum age requirement to claim the seniority pension with the 
quota mechanism.10 As the age requirement was necessary but not sufficient to claim an 
early benefit, as a seniority requirement (in terms years of contribution) was also 
requested, some workers retire later than the early retirement age. In addition, workers 
reaching 40 years of contribution could retire irrespective of their age, hence the 
proportion of workers retiring in each year is different from zero. At the age of 66 (67 
with the deferral), that is when the old-age requirement for men is met, there is a smaller 
spike, of about 10 per cent, as most workers are already out of the labour force. The 
second cohort, born in 1965, retires in the period 2022-2036; the path is similar to the 
one displayed by the cohort born in 1955, absent the spike at age 58 (because the NDC 
option for women is no longer available). The spike corresponding to the early 
retirement age (plus deferral) for this cohort is visible at ages 63 and 64 (years 2028 and 
2029), and the spike for old-age is in the year 2033 at age 68, a consequence of the 
                                                 
10
 The minimum age for early retirement before the reform would have been 61, which with the 
deferral of 12 (18) months would become 62 (and a half) years. As our population is born uniformly over 
the year, individuals born in December 1955, say, meet their minimum age requirement in the year 2018. 
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indexing of requirements to life expectancy. A similar path is visible for the cohort born 
in 1975, where the spikes are at ages 65 in 2040 and 69-70 in the years 2044-45, and, 
finally, for the cohort born in 1985, with spikes at ages 66-67 and 70-71. 
<Figure 3 around here> 
The bottom panel of the figure shows the impact of the reform on the retirement 
pattern. The most striking feature is the disappearance of the early retirement spikes 
from the figure: starting with the eldest cohort, born in 1955, the highest spike, of about 
45 per cent, is at age 67, the old-age requirement for both men and women that will be 
in place in 2022. However, the possibility for women to opt for the NDC and retire at 
age 58 is still in place and evident in the figure. Subsequent cohorts show the retirement 
path in the presence of the two exit routes allowed by the reform, that is either a total 
seniority of at least 41/42 years for women/men (for the 1965 cohort, but increasing 
with mortality for subsequent cohorts) or the attainment of the old-age requirement, 
coupled with a minimum of 20 years of seniority. The old age at which it is possible to 
claim the pension check is also expected to increase with longevity: for example, for the 
generation born in 1965 the old-age requirement is equal to 68 years and 8 months in 
the years 2033 and 2034. As in our model individuals are born uniformly within the 
year, individuals born in the first quarter of 1965 accrue the age requirement in 2033 
and receive their first pension benefit in that year, while the others accrue the age 
requirement in the following year (hence the spike in the year 2034). The cohort born in 
1975, in addition to the old age spike in 2045, exhibits a spike in 2042, due to NDC 
workers (that is workers who entered the labour market after 1995) retiring at the 
minimum age, which is 66 and 8 months. The workers born in 1985 all belong to the 
NDC scheme, and exhibit a spike in 2053 (when they reach the minimum retirement age 
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of 68 years and 2 months). Only workers whose accrued pension is at least 2.8 times the 
social allowance, however, can retire at that minimum age; a second spike in present in 
2056-57, when this cohort reaches the normal retirement age, when it is possible to 
retire having accrued a pension greater than 1.5 times the social allowance. Workers 
with poorer working careers remain in the labour force until they reach the maximum 
age of 75 years and 11 months in the year 2060, or of 76 years and 2 months in 2061. 
<Table 6 around here> 
We next show the average age of retirement for the various sub-groups of 
workers considered in the model. In table 6 we report the average age of retirement 
before and after the reform, distinguishing between private employees and self-
employed workers, and between men and women. Starting with the upper left panel, in 
the absence of the reform the average retirement age for male private employees born in 
1955 would have been 63.5 years: these workers could retire  because they reached the 
legal old age (65 years, plus a minimum of 20 years of contribution), because they had 
accumulated 40 years of contributions, or because they were at least 61 with at least 35 
years of contribution (with the sum of the two numbers reaching quota 97). Once they 
reached one of these minimum requirements they still had to wait 12 months (deferral 
time) before being entitled to the benefit. The average figure shown in the table reflects 
the fact that, in our simulations, about one third of the simulated private employees 
were entitled to retire because they reached the contribution ceiling, while about 43 per 
cent could retire with the early option of quota 97. Even in the pre-reform scenario, the 
legal retirement ages were linked to expected longevity, hence for subsequent cohorts 
the average age of retirement increased accordingly, reaching 65.6 years on average for 
the cohort born in 1985, which is completely NDC, but in the pre-reform scenario could 
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retire with same rules as the previous MDB or PR cohorts. A similar pattern is followed 
by male self-employed workers, in the upper right panel of the table, who reached 
retirement on average 1.2 years earlier than private employees because their careers are 
less unstable and they are more likely to complete 40 years of contributions. 
For women, shown in the lower panel of table 6, the pre-reform scenario is more 
or less the same, but with an important distinction, as they had the possibility to opt for 
the NDC system until December 31, 201511. This possibility is reflected in the relatively 
low average retirement age displayed by the cohort born in 1955, for which our model 
simulates that about 30 per cent retires meeting the requirements for the option to the 
NDC regime12. In addition, the 1955 cohort benefitted from an old age of retirement 
lower than men, while subsequent cohorts faced an increase in the old age requirement 
to meet the one for men (parity of requisites was due by the year 2026). Hence, younger 
cohorts had no longer the option to opt for the NDC system, and were requested an 
increased old age: as a consequence the average retirement age increased substantially: 
for example, for the cohort born in 1965 it increased to almost 66 years, that is about 
five years more than the 1955 cohort. It is interesting to notice that the predicted 
average age of retirement was higher for women than for men: this follows the fact that 
relatively less women reach the maximum contribution level for which it is possible to 
retire irrespective of age (which was equal to 40 years of seniority before the 2011 
reform). 
The comparison with the results obtained in the “after the reform” scenario 
shows that the average retirement age increases for all categories of workers and for all 
                                                 
11
 This possibility has been confirmed by the reform of 2011. 
12
 That is age equal to at least 57 years and 3 months, and 35 years of contributions, plus a 
deferral of 12-18 months for employees/self-employed workers. 
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the cohorts considered. Starting with men private employees born in 1955, the average 
age of retirement increases to 65.9 years, with an average increase of almost 2.4 years 
with respect to the pre-reform scenario. Younger generations, for which the NDC 
system gradually phases in, face a bigger increase in average retirement age of about 3 
years. For the self-employed men the pattern is the same, with an average retirement age 
increasing by about 2 years for the eldest cohort born in 1955, and by 3 to 3.7 years for 
younger cohorts. In addition, their average retirement age is lower than that for 
employees because they tend to retire with seniority pensions.13  
For women the increase is less pronounced, with the sole exception of the 1955 
cohort for which the increase, in the case of employees, is about 4 years, a result due to 
the acceleration imposed by the reform in the alignment of the old age requirements 
between genders. Before the reform, the old age requirement 61 (62, including deferral 
time) in the years 2016-2017; after the reform, in the same years, it becomes 65, further 
increasing to 66 in 2018, hence women born in 1955 will be able to retire, with the old 
age option, in 202114. Women born in 1965 already in the pre-reform scenario faced the 
increase in the old age requirement, and now display a smaller  increase of about 2.2 
years. For subsequent cohorts, the average increase in retirement age ranges from 2 to 3 
years both for employees and for the self-employed. In addition, the average retirement 
age is about 1 year higher than that for men, again because for women, especially when 
private employees, the total number of years of contributions tends to be lower than for 
men, and as a consequence they are less likely to qualify for a seniority pension.  
 
                                                 
13
 The required years of contributions were gradually increased after the reform, but less than the 
old age requirement. 
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4.2 The replacement rate  
As a measure of the ability of the pension system to preserve income levels, we 
compute the replacement rate as the ratio between the first benefit and the average 
income of the last 4 years before retirement15. The ability of the pension system to 
preserve income levels can be considered a spurious but very intuitive and widespread 
indicator of the adequacy of a pension system16.  
<Table 7 around here> 
Looking at the scenario before the 2011 reform, the effect of the gradual shift to 
the contribution-based benefit is quite striking. For example, private employees men 
born in 1955 (MDB workers) were entitled on average to a benefit equal to about 72 per 
cent of their last salaries. For the generation born in 1965, which includes pro-rata 
workers, the replacement rate reduced to 65 per cent, although the average retirement 
age increased by 0.9 years, as already shown in table 6. The pre-reform replacement rate 
reduced to about 64 per cent for younger generations, for which the contribution-based 
part of the benefit was almost (born in 1975) or completely (born in 1985) active. For 
the self-employed workers the reduction in the average replacement rate was even more 
dramatic, as in the MDB system their benefit was computed with more or less the same 
rules in force for the employees, while their payroll tax rate was considerably lower. 
                                                 
15
 We take the average to smooth out temporary shocks to income. All figures are gross of the 
income tax and of the payroll tax paid by the worker, so this is a gross replacement rate. 
16
 Indeed, it focusses on the sole pension system and does not account for the compensatory 
(re)distributive effects of the tax system or of the other welfare state programs. In addition, in a life cycle 
framework the adequacy does not directly imply the constancy of the income as individuals more 




Before the reform, the average replacement rate for men falls from 74.7 per cent (1955 
cohort, MDB) to about 42.9 per cent (1985 cohort, NDC).  
For women, both employee and self-employed, the pre-reform situation was 
analogous, although it should be noted that for the cohort born in 1955 the average 
replacement rate was lower with respect to men, reflecting the lower average retirement 
age already shown in the previous section (due to the possibility to retire earlier if 
opting for the NDC system and to the lower old age requirement). 
The “after the reform” scenario shows the great increase in the benefit and in the 
replacement rate that follows from an increase in the retirement age when the  benefit is 
computed with the contribution-based formula. This is due to the increase in the annuity 
rates which govern the computation of the pension check in the NDC system: as they 
reflect residual life expectancy at the moment of retirement, a one-year postponement 
induces to an increase of the coefficient of about 4 per cent. For example, while for the 
cohort born in 1955 the increase in the replacement rate is about 6.6 percentage points 
for men private-employees men, that is about 3 percentage points for each year of 
postponement, for younger cohorts of employees the advantage of each year of 
postponing retirement is an increase of about (and even in excess of) 4 percentage 
points in the replacement rate. Hence, for example, an employed men born in 1985 
could expect to retire with an average replacement rate equal to 64.2 per cent before the 
reform, while after the reform he can expect to retire with a replacement rate equal to 
77.5 per cent (having worked four years longer). For self-employed workers the figures 
are about the same, with the cohort born in 1955 benefiting very little from the 
postponement of retirement, while the subsequent cohorts increase their replacement 
rate by about 4 percentage points per additional working year. Hence, the increase in the 
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retirement age contrasts, at least partially, the reduction in the replacement rates faced 
by self-employed workers. 
Finally, the cohort of women born in 1955, which face the greatest increase in 
the retirement age, benefit from an increase of 13.2 percentage points in their 
replacement rates17. 
 
4.3 The Present Value Ratio 
As a money’s worth measure we compute the so-called Present Value Ratio 
(PVR) or, in other words, the benefit-to-tax ratio, i.e. the ratio between the present value 
of the pension benefits to be received and the present value of payroll taxes paid, both 
valued at retirement. If the PVR is greater than one when calculated at an interest rate 
equal to the GDP’s growth rate, then the system is granting to retired individuals more 
than would be justified in a pension system in financial equilibrium. Hence this quantity 
also measures inter-generational redistribution, indicating, when greater than one, that  
on average the system is redistributing resources from generations active in the labour 
market to currently retired ones. 
<Table 8 around here> 
Inspection of table 8, pre-reform scenario, reveals how in the MDB system 
(cohort born in 1955) the average present value of pension benefits was higher than the 
                                                 
17
 Our model is also able to simulate the second pillar pension, as in 2007 a reform incentivized 
the participation in the second pillar. Assuming a contribution rate of 6.91 per cent (that is, the percentage 
devoted to the severance pay - Trattamento di Fine Rapporto, TFR – that the reform incentivized to divert 
to the second pillar) for all workers, a real return of 2 per cent, and contributions starting in 2007, would 
result in an additional 5 percentage points in the replacement rate for the cohort born in 1955, increasing 




present value of the payroll taxes paid: private employees men, before the reform, had a 
ratio equal to 1.55, or, in other words, on average they received from the system 55 per 
cent more than they paid in. As the PR and the NDC systems phased in, the PVR was 
reduced: in the NDC system, for men employees, it was very close to one (1.03). Self-
employed workers born in 1955 had a much higher PVR (2.71), as they benefitted from 
a defined benefit check and a payroll tax rate lower than employees. Under the NDC 
system (cohort born in 1985) self-employed men still had a PVR greater than 1 (1.36 
before the reform) as they were more likely than employees to qualify for the social 
allowance. Women followed the same pattern, with a higher PVR on average due both 
to higher life expectancy and to a higher probability to qualify for the social allowance. 
After the reform the PVR is reduced for all categories. For the cohort born in 
1955 this reduction is also due to the change in the benefit computation formula which, 
although only for the last working years, is based on the contributions effectively paid. 
This shift, coupled with a less likely resort to the minimum benefit, implies a reduction 
in the PVR of about 20 percentage points for all the categories considered. 
As the NDC reform is phased in, the reduction in the PVR implied by the 2011 
reform is lessened, although it does not disappear especially for women and for self-
employed workers, both men and women. This is due to the fact that the increase in 
their retirement age implies an increase in their pension check as well, and the 
probability that they end up receiving the social allowance is consequently lower. 
<Figure 4 around here> 
In figure 4 we show the path of the individual PVR, before and after the reform, 
through time. For the cohort born in 1955, formed by workers of the MDB type, the 
PVR is almost always greater than one, decreasing with retirement age. For the 
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following cohorts, as the NDC system phases in, not only the average PVR decreases, 
but individuals retiring later, within each cohort, tend to earn a higher PVR. This is due 
to the eligibility requirements for the pure NDC workers, who must wait until the 
maximum age if their accrued pension check is lower than a certain threshold, and 
hence have a higher probability to qualify for the social allowance. After the reform, 
this tendency is mitigated by the increase in the maximum age requirement, which 
lowers the probability of qualifying for the social allowance. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work we use a microsimulation model to analyse the evolution over time 
of retirement ages, adequacy and the distributive properties of the Italian pension 
system after the reform of 2011, as compared to the pre-reform setting. We follow four 
artificial cohorts born between 1955 and 1985, retiring between 2010 and 2060, 
uncovering the evolution of the pension system until the NDC system will be fully 
phased in. 
Our simulations show that after the reform of 2011 the average retirement age 
increases for all categories of workers and for all the cohorts considered. In particular, 
for men private employees born in 1955, the average age of retirement is 65.9 years, 
with an average increase of 2.4 years with respect to the pre-reform scenario. Younger 
generations, for which the NDC system gradually phases in, face a bigger increase in 
average retirement age of about 3 years. For self-employed men the pattern is the same, 
with an average retirement age increasing by about 2 years for the eldest cohort born in 
1955, and by 3 to 3.7 years for younger cohorts. For women the increase is less 
pronounced, with the exception of the 1955 cohort for which the increase, in the case of 
employees, is about 4 years, a result due to the harmonization of the old age 
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requirement between genders. For subsequent cohorts, the average increase in 
retirement age ranges from 2 to 3 years both for employees and for the self-employed. 
The postponement of retirement enhances the adequacy of the benefits. The 
replacement rate increases with the retirement age as a consequence of the application 
of the defined contribution rule for all individuals starting from the year 2012. Pre- 
versus post-reform results reveal, for the cohort born in 1985, an increase of 13-15 
percentage points in the replacement rates for men and about 9-11 per cent for women. 
This is particularly relevant for self-employed workers, who contribute with a lower 
payroll tax rate to the system, and are at risk of not accruing adequate pension benefits 
in the NDC system. Participation in the second pillar, which at present is still not 
pervasive in Italy (Commissione di Vigilanza sui Fondi Pensione, 2013), would increase 
replacement rates and adequacy in an obvious way. 
As an effect of the introduction of the notional defined contribution (NDC) rule, 
inter- and intra-generational distribution is greatly reduced. The results, in particular, 
show the strong reduction in the present value ratio (PVR) granted to self-employed 
workers as the NDC system is applied. Among the cohort fully covered by the NDC 
rule the average PVR is, as expected, very close to one. However, redistribution is still 
in place for women, on average characterized by less rich career profiles, and for self-
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1 – MDB and PR workers, eligibility requirements in 2011 (before the reform) 
 Men Women 
Old age  65 years of age 20 years of contribution 
60 years of age 
20 years of contribution 





Quota 96: with at least 60 years of age and 35 years of 
contribution 
Self-employed Quota 97: with at least 61 years of age and 35 years of 
contribution 
Note: all ages linked to life expectancy. Deferral time: 12/18 months (private 
empolyees/self-employed) 
 
Table 2 – NDC workers, eligibility requirements in 2011 (before the reform) 
 Men Women 
Old age  65 years of age 5 years of contribution 
60 years of age 
5 years of contribution 





Quota 96: with at least 60 years of age and 35 years of 
contribution 
Self-employed Quota 97: with at least 61 years of age and 35 years of 
contribution 








Table 3 – MDB and PR workers, eligibility criteria in 2012 (after the reform) 
 Men Women 
Old age  66 years of age 20 years of contribution 
62/63 years of age (private 
employees/self-employed, 
reaching 66 in 2018) 
20 years of contribution 
Seniority 42 years 41 years 
Early 
retirement Abolished 




Table 4 – NDC workers, eligibility requirements in 2012 (after the reform) 
 Men Women  
Old age 
70 years of age (minimum seniority 5 years) 
Possibility of anticipated retirement at age 63 if check is at least 2.8 times 
the social allowance, or at age 66 if check is at least 1.5 times the social 
allowance (minimum seniority 20 years). 
Seniority 42 years and 1 month  41 years and 1 month  
Early 
retirement Abolished 
Note: all ages and seniority requirements linked to life expectancy. Deferral time: 
abolished 
 
Table 5 – Annuity rates – evolution over time 
Born in: 1965 1975 1985 
Age δ 1/δ δ 1/δ δ 1/δ 
65 0.04750 21.1 0.04617 21.7 0.04455 22.4 
66 0.04888 20.5 0.04749 21.1 0.04567 21.9 
67 0.05027 19.9 0.04825 20.7 0.04693 21.3 
68 0.05231 19.12 0.05017 19.9 0.04911 20.4 
69 0.05240 19.08 0.05155 19.4 0.04957 20.2 
70 0.05516 18.1 0.05391 18.5 0.05118 19.5 
Note: predicted annuity rates (δ) at different ages for different generations. 1/δ is 
approximately the average life expectancy in years implied by δ. The generation born in 
1965 is aged 65-70 in the years 2030-35, the generation born in 1975 in the years 2040-
45 and the generation born in 1985 in the years 1950-55. 






Table 6 – Average age of retirement 
Private Employees Self-Employed 
1955 1965 1975 1985 1955 1965 1975 1985 
Men 
Before the reform 63.53 64.42 65.05 65.65 62.45 63.44 63.85 64.23 
After the reform 65.94 67.48 68.21 68.78 64.34 66.17 67.12 67.96 
Women 
Before the reform 60.75 65.79 66.85 67.51 60.74 64.22 64.93 65.76 
After the reform 64.87 68.02 69.15 70.15 62.77 66.32 67.59 68.79 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 7 – Average and Median Replacement Rate (first pillar, per cent) 
Private Employees Self-Employed 
1955 1965 1975 1985 1955 1965 1975 1985 
Men 
Before the reform 
Average 72.06 65.00 63.18 64.25 74.72 50.83 44.58 42.88 
Median 72.13 65.10 62.92 64.02 76.66 51.43 44.74 40.84 
After the reform 
Average 78.70 76.64 77.40 77.55 76.62 59.94 56.70 57.41 
Median 80.78 77.10 77.35 77.24 78.23 60.31 56.78 56.98 
Women 
Before the reform 
Average 62.78 64.03 62.92 64.20 67.30 49.72 46.39 45.95 
Median 61.78 63.92 62.42 63.29 71.43 50.06 45.82 43.02 
After the reform 
Average 76.00 72.10 72.49 73.97 70.33 56.72 54.76 56.41 
Median 70.56 71.22 71.51 72.86 71.25 57.46 54.11 57.56 





Table 8 – Average Present Value Ratio (PVR) 
Private Employees Self-Employed 
1955 1965 1975 1985 1955 1965 1975 1985 
Men 
Before the reform 1.55 1.12 1.02 1.03 2.71 1.52 1.43 1.36 
After the reform 1.41 1.09 1.00 1.01 2.37 1.33 1.17 1.10 
Women 
Before the reform 1.88 1.21 1.13 1.18 3.11 1.66 1.63 1.71 
After the reform 1.64 1.18 1.10 1.13 2.75 1.44 1.30 1.26 





Figure 1 – Full-time employees working in the center of Italy, cohort born in 1975 
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Figure 2 – Self-employed working  in the center of Italy, cohort born in 1975 
 
Note: values expressed in 2010 euro. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Retirees before and after the reform of 2011 
 













Figure 4 – Present Value Ratio before and after the reform of 2011 
 









Appendix - The microsimulation model  
 
The microsimulation model is designed to analyse the distributional features 
embedded in the Italian pension system during its transition from a DB system to an 
NDC system. It is composed of two main modules: the population and the pension 
module. 
 
A1. The cohort population module 
This module includes a demographic section and a labour market section, which 
simulate all the main life events of individuals. Individuals’ transitions across different 
states (marital status, labour status, etc.) are conditioned on individual socioeconomic 
characteristics and are modelled throughout a Monte Carlo procedure, that is, they are 
evaluated by performing a random draw from a uniform distribution and comparing it to 
the relevant probability taken from available sociodemographic surveys or from national 
statistics data. If the value of the draw is higher than the sample probability, the 
individual changes his status; if not, the individual remains in the initial state. 
Once individuals are born, their lives evolve according to various routines which 
determine the day and month of birth, gender, region of residence, performance in the 
labour market, family status, and survival. We illustrate these routines in turn after 
briefly describing the data sources used. 
A1.1. Data sources 
Transition probabilities are drawn from the national statistics (Istituto Nazionale 
di Statistica, ISTAT) data and from two national micro datasets: the Bank of Italy’s 
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Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) and a sample of administrative data 
drawn from the main social security scheme (Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale, 
INPS) archive, the file LoSai (Longitudinal Sample INPS). 
The INPS archive officially records the complete earnings and contribution 
histories of all participants, that is, employees in the private sector and some categories 
of self-employed (craftsmen, tradesmen, and farmers). The available sample is formed 
by all individuals born on the first and the ninth of each month of any year — so that the 
theoretical sample frequency is 24:365 — and reports employment spells until 2012. 
The archive contains very rich information about the earnings histories of the workers, 
recording spells of unemployment, sickness, as well as labour income earned each year. 
As typical with administrative data, demographic information is, on the other 
hand, less rich: the sample records the date and province of birth of the worker, as well 
as gender. No information about family status is available, nor about the education level 
of the worker. For this reason we complement it with information contained in the 
SHIW, which is run about every two years since 1989 to 2012 on a representative 
sample of about 8,000 Italian households. 
 
A1.2. Life-invariant characteristics 
At the beginning of the simulation of each cohort, a user-set number of 
individuals aged 0 are created. The life-invariant characteristics routine randomly 
assigns each individual a date of birth, gender, and region of residence through a Monte 
Carlo procedure. In each cohort the date of birth is uniformly distributed through the 
year: this feature of the program allows to accurately model the moment when a worker 
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is eligible to claim a pension benefit. Gender and region of residence are randomly 
assigned according to the gender and the regional distribution of newborn in the year 
2013 (ISTAT website, www.demo.istat.it, 2013). 
<Table A1 around here> 
 
A1.3. Mortality 
In each time period every individual enters the mortality subroutine, which 
determines whether that individual will survive or not in the simulated time period on 
the basis of gender-specific mortality tables. Individuals who are predicted to die in the 
simulated year still enter all subsequent routines until the cycle for the year in progress 
is completed. Afterwards, they are recorded as dead and are no longer taken into 
account in the population routines. 
All our simulations are based on mortality tables provided by ISTAT. We use 
historical data from 1974 to 2010 and official ISTAT projections from 2011 to 2065. 
From 2065 on, mortality rates are kept constant.  
 
A1.4. Education 
In the program, individuals are forced into school until they turn 16 (that is, they 
complete compulsory education) and they cannot start contributing into the pension 
system before then. Compulsory school age increased along years. However, according 
to SHIW data, the fraction of individuals starting to work before the age of 16 is low 
even for the cohort born in 1955.  
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After completion of compulsory schooling, the individual decides whether to 
continue studying or not. The routine models this decision as a random process and the 
probabilities of getting a higher degree or a university degree are derived from the 
SHIW data. Frequencies are allowed to vary according to gender and region of 
residence (north, centre, or south). 
We do not account for school dropouts and once an individual decides to start a 
cycle of study, he or she completes it. This hypothesis is forced by SHIW data, which 
only report the highest educational degree achieved by each individual. Individuals who 
choose not to continue studying and individuals who complete their college enter the 
participation routine18. 
 
<Table A2 around here> 
 
A1.5. Participation 
When individuals choose to no longer be students (or are forced to quit school 
by the program because they are university graduates), they decide whether or not to 
enter the labour force. This decision is modelled as a once and for all choice: if an 
individual decides to enter the labour force, that individual will remain active in the 
labour market until retirement (or death), possibly facing spells of unemployment. On 
the other hand, if an individual decides not to enter the labour force, he or she will 
remain forever out of it. 
                                                 
18
 Postgraduate education in Italy is still quite limited and is not modelled. 
44 
 
Participation rates are specific for cohorts (born before and after 1970), gender, 
and region. In particular, we take the participation rate for the age class 25-34 in two 
different calendar years, 1993 and in 2010, from the Labour Force Survey (ISTAT), and 
treat the first one as the participation rate of the cohorts born before 1970 and the 
second one as the participation rate of the cohorts born after that date. The participation 
rates are reported in table A3.  
 
<Table A3 around here> 
 
A1.6. First job 
An individual joining the labour force for the first time enters the first-job 
routine. According to the observed probabilities, the individual can succeed in finding a 
first job in the current year. If a job is not found, the individual is recorded as not 
employed and will re-enter this routine in the following time periods. The probability of 
finding a first occupation is drawn from SHIW data for the only cohort for which we 
have enough data to compute the relevant probabilities (individuals born between 1970 
and 1979). We assume the same probabilities apply to all cohorts. The probabilities also 
vary according to age class (younger or older than 24 years), gender, and region of 
residence (north, centre, and south). As the probabilities vary according to age class, we 
implicitly take into account the education level (college graduates enter the labour force 
after they turn 24). 





A1.7. Kind of employment and social security scheme 
Once an individual finds an occupation, he or she is randomly assigned to a 
social security scheme and a professional qualification. These characteristics do not 
change throughout the individual’s lifetime. 
The assignment of the social security scheme proceeds in two steps: A first 
random draw determines to which of three main schemes the worker belongs: private 
sector employees, or self-employed. The relevant probabilities, computed from the 
SHIW data, vary according to region of residence (north, centre, or south), education 
level (mandatory school, high school, or university degree), gender, and cohort (born 
before or after 1960). 
A second random draw determines the social security sub-scheme to which the 
self-employed worker belongs: craftsman (61 percent if males, 40 percent if females) or 
tradesman (39 percent if males, 60 percent if females). The appropriate frequencies are 
computed for each gender using our administrative data sample.  
A third random draw determines, where relevant, whether the individual is white 
collar or blue collar, conditional on being a private sector employee. Individuals who 
start working before age 18 are registered as blue collar, individuals who start working 
after that age have a probability of 35 percent of being blue collar.19 These frequencies 
are computed from the administrative data without any further sub-grouping. 
                                                 
19
 According to both administrative data and the SHIW sample, blue collar workers are about 70 




A1.8. Number of weeks 
Conditional on having a job and on the number of weeks worked in the previous 
year, this routine determines the number of weeks worked. 
We compute sample frequencies for private employees. To do so, we take two 
steps: We first discretize the number of weeks worked each year in our administrative 
panel into six classes (0, 1-13, 14-26, 27-39, 40-47, 48-52) and then we compute 
transition probabilities for each age class (16-24, 25-34 and 35-64) and for each region 
(north, centre, and south). 
For the self-employed, we assume that, conditional on working, they work 52 
weeks per year20. Using our administrative sample, we compute the probabilities of 
being unemployed conditional on the past year’s employment status. These probabilities 
vary according to age (in classes), gender, and region of residence21. 
 
A1.9. Earnings   
Earnings profiles are estimated on administrative data separately for private 
sector and self-employed workers, men and women, white and blue collar22. 










γi ~ (0, 2γσ ) ; ηit ~ (0, 2ησ ) 
                                                 
20
 According to our administrative data, the fraction of self-employed working less than a full 
year is negligible and we do not model it. 
21
 The probability of being employed conditional on being unemployed in the previous year 
varies only according to age class and gender. 
22
 The self-employed are further differentiated into craftsmen and tradesmen. 
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where xit is a vector of individual characteristics, including a constant, a polynomial in 
age (third degree for self-employed, fourth degree for employees), cohort dummies 
(cohorts 1935, 1945, 1955, 1965, 1975), regional dummies (north, centre, south), and 
time dummies, which are assumed to sum to zero and be orthogonal to a time trend. Ln 
yit are the logarithm of earnings for full time workers working a full year, expressed at 
2010 prices. The estimated coefficients are reported in tables A6  and A7. 
The unobserved component is assumed to be the sum of a random effect (γi) 
which does not vary over time and is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables 
included in the equation, plus an AR(1) component with parameter ρ. In the 
microsimulation model, each individual is given an average log earnings profile for his 
or her age and group (defined by cohort, gender, region, and occupation) plus an error 
term formed by the sum of the two unobserved components. The first one is drawn from 
a normal distribution with variance 2γσ  at the beginning of active life and it permanently 
shifts up or down the average profile for the individual to whom it refers. The second 
component, which is also individual specific and varies over time, is formed by the 
shock from the previous period times the autoregressive parameter ρ plus an error term 
drawn from a normal distribution with variance 2ησ . 
<Table A5 around here> 





A1.10. Marital status 
In this routine individuals are recorded as children (as opposed to heads of 
households) until they finish their schooling years. When they are between 14 and 50 
years of age, provided they are no longer students, they may get married according to 
the gender- and age-specific probabilities derived from Istat data 2013. Conditional on 
being married, an individual faces the possibility of becoming divorced (probabilities 
also derived from Istat 2013 data) or widowed according to the mortality table used in 
the program. It should be noted that we do not explicitly model the spouse or his or her 
income. Marital status becomes relevant, however, when computing individual social 
security wealth. 
 
A2. The pension module 
The pension module is a very detailed module able to compute pensionable 
earnings and contributions paid, check the eligibility requirements, and compute the 
pension benefit for a number of schemes and for different regimes. Pension benefits of 
the first and second pillars are computed for individuals who retire from the year 2010 
onwards. 
The program is able to replicate the pre-2011 reform system as well as the 2011 
reform, which further tightened eligibility requirements and introduced an NDC pro-rata 
benefit formula for all workers from 2012 onwards.  
The schemes covered, as already mentioned, are private sector employees and 
the self-employed, the latter categorized into craftsmen and tradesmen. These schemes 
greatly differed in eligibility rules, payroll taxes and the computation of benefits until 
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the 1995 reform imposed uniformity. The equalising process, which has been gradual, is 
at present almost complete. Differences in the definition of pensionable earnings (or 
income) and in payroll tax rates are nonetheless also maintained in the future. 
This module further computes for each individual the present value of payroll 
taxes paid during the whole working life and the present value of the pension benefits to 
be received. These two quantities are the building blocks of the Present Value Ratio 
(PVR), used in the analysis to assess intergenerational redistribution. 
 
The second-pillar module 
 
We also model participation in the second pillar. Since June 2007 a tacit approval 
mechanism is in place, i.e. the severance payment flows of private employees (6.91 of 
their gross wages) are automatically redirected to the complementary pension schemes, 
unless the worker explicitly denies it. Despite this, adhesion rates to the second pillar 
are still very low, reaching in 2012 only the 25.5 per cent of the total working 
population (Commissione di Vigilanza sui Fondi Pensione data, 2013).  
 
In our simulations, we model participation in the second pillar pension system simply 
assuming that either no-one participates or all workers participate. In particular, in the 
latter case, we assumed that all private workers and self-employed automatically 
transfer 6.91 percent of their gross earnings to pension funds from 2007 onwards.  
 
 
Table A1. Gender and region of residence incidence. 
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Newborn males incidence 51.30% 
Dwelling place incidence   
 North 45.88% 
 Centre 19.57% 
 South 34.55% 
Source: Istat, www.demo.istat.it, year 2013. 
 
Table A2. Education level by gender, region, and cohort (percentage). 
 Males Females 
 North Centre South North Centre South 
Cohort 1940-1959       
Compulsory school 52.6 55.2 62.8 60.6 62.7 69.4 
High school 36.7 35.0 27.7 30.1 27.4 22.8 
College 10.7 9.8 9.5 9.3 9.9 7.8 
Cohort 1960-1979       
Compulsory school 38.4 37.7 49.6 32.6 33.5 47.9 
High school 47.9 48.1 38.4 50.8 49.3 36.8 
College 13.7 14.3 12.0 16.6 17.2 15.3 




Table A3. Participation rates by cohort, gender, and region (percentage).  
  
Men 




North Centre South 
 
North Centre South 
Cohorts born in 
1970 or before 0.954 0.949 0.919  0.687 0.632 0.434 
Cohorts born after 
1970  0.925 0.889 0.917  0.779 0.687 0.460 





Table A4. Probability of unemployment conditional on looking for a first job (percentage). 
Males   
 Younger than 24 years 24 years or older 
Cohort 70-79   
North 9.2 5.3 
Centre 24.9 13.3 
South 51.2 32.2 
   
Females   
 Younger than 24 years 24 years or older 
Cohort 70-79   
North 18.0 6.8 
Centre 27.9 16.5 
South 66.5 47.8 




Table A5. Estimated Coefficients for log-income profiles 
 Men Women 
 Blue collar White collar Self-employed Blue collar White collar Self-employed 
Age 0.201873 0.138882 0.02948 0.103233 0.1107746 0.002049 
Age^2 /10 -0.00637 -0.00305 -0.00014 -0.0043 -0.00340846 0.000305 
Age^3 /100 9.64E-05 3.86E-05 -6.78E-07 8.83E-05 6.02E-05 -2.73E-06 
Age^4 /1000 -5.51E-07 -2.17E-07  -6.34E-07 -4.10E-07  
Constant 7.381727 7.920373 8.835824 8.473592 8.383372 9.245498 
North 0.203177 0.201374 0.223784 0.164581 0.240599 0.142439 
Centre 0.140626 0.152709 0.164712 0.124945 0.191567 0.109449 
South 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Born in 1935 -0.40038 -0.5244 -0.37894 -0.80243 -0.68071 -0.38645 
Born in 1945 -0.23434 -0.35535 -0.24867 -0.48498 -0.50368 -0.234 
Born in 1955 -0.17549 -0.23372 -0.17033 -0.26276 -0.37672 -0.1383 
Born in 1965 -0.1196 -0.12842 -0.06603 -0.13353 -0.21208 -0.03874 
Born in 1975 -0.064 -0.09335 -0.01393 -0.00513 -0.08584 0.013576 
Born in 1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Craftsmen   -0.03688   0.011514 
       
N 8,704,608 3,868,698 4,300,649 2,687,639 2,854,982 1,794,531 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on LoSai (Longitudinal Sample INPS). Note: all 




Table A6. Estimates for unobserved error components.  














ρ 0.540733 0.69937 0.544281 0.393984 0.406608 0.544307 
ησ  0.296131 0.372813 0.349698 0.430697 0.365474 0.29045 
γσ  0.176466 0.156546 0.294566 0.289615 0.230275 0.253327 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on LoSai (Longitudinal Sample INPS) 
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